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THE RULE-MAKING POWER OF THE COURTS*
IV
CONSTITUTIONALITY.

J.

In General.

W

ITH regard to the constitutionality of the proposal, the first
question that occurs to every lawyer is whether the legislature
may delegate the rule-making power to the courts.
It seems strange that, in view of the history of English and American procedural law, this question should occur to anyone as presenting
a serious objection, but the reason is, of course, that we have got so
far away from the original method of regulating court procedure that
our inclination is to believe that legislative codes are the only way in
which court procedure can be prescribed. As a matter of fact, as
pointed out by Roscoe Pound, when codes of procedure were first
enacted by legislatures, many judges even went so far as to render
dicta to the effect that the legislature had no power to touch the rules
of court.13 ,
Further misapprehension of the nature of the rule-making power has

probably
exercised
power is
objection
that the
that it is

arisen from the deduction that because the legislature has
a certain power with the acquiescence of the courts, the
exclusively legislative. But in order to get away from the
of unlawful delegation of powers, it is not necessary to show
rule-making power is not inherently legislative, or further,
exclusively judicial. If by long usage, custom or interpreta-

* The first installment of this article appeared m the preceding issue of the

REVIEW. See 1 WASH. L. REv. 163.
11 Judge Selden in the case of Reubens v. Joel, 13 N. Y. 488-494-495 (1856),
took this position. See also Voorhz v. Childs Ez'r 17 N. Y. 354 (1858). See
Booth v. Bank, 1 N. Y. Supr. Ct. 45 (1873) for adverse criticism of Booth
case, see Distlerv. Dabney, 3 Wash. 200, 204, 28 Fac. 335 (1891).
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tion, and an examination of the history of the power, it appears that
while legislatures have consistently encroached upon the courts in this
respect, and while the power may be viewed in a sense as legislative, it
is also judicial in nature, then, surely, the legislature can withhold
legislative action if it desires without infringing upon the principle of
unlawful delegation of powers. In other words, as stated in Wayman
36
v. Southard,"
and many other cases, the objection of unlawful delegation of powers applies to those powers which are in their nature
essentially or exclusively legislative. Furthermore, if the position is
taken that the rule-making power is of doubtful character, as was said
in the Minnesota case of State ex Vel Patterson V Bates-'"The assignment of powers not specifically distributed by
the constitution is a legislative function, and when powers of
an ambiguous character are assigned to the judiciary any doubt
will be resolved in favor of the validity of the statute."
In

United States Bank v.

Halstead,1 3

Mr.

Justice

Thompson

declared.
"Congress might regulate the whole practice of the courts
if it was deemed expedient so to do, but this power is vested
in the courts; and it has ndver occurred to anyone that it was
a delegation of legislative power."
Furthermore, in the case of Beers et al. v. Haughton, '13 Mr. Justice
Story, in 1835, referring to previous decisions of the Supreme Court
of the United States, said.
"It was there held that this delegation of power by Congress
was perfectly constitutional, that the power to alter and add
to the process and modes of proceeding in a suit embraced the
whole progress of the suit, and every transaction in it from
its commencement to its termination, and until the judgment
should be satisfied, and that it authorized the courts to prescribe and regulate the conduct of the officer in the execution
of final process, in giving effect to its judgment. And it was
emphatically laid down, that 'a general superintendence over
this subject seems to be properly within the judicial province
and has always been so considered.' "
4
In the Ohio case of State v. Harmon,'1
0
it was held that in determining whether a particular power belonged exclusively to a particular
department, regard must be had to its history, and especially to the exer-

10 Wheat. (U. S.) 1, 42, 6 L. Ed. 953 (1825), Marshall, C. J.
96 Minn. 110, 104 N. W 709 (1905).

" 10 Wheat. (U. S.) 51, 6 L. Ed. 264 (1825).
9 Pet. 329, 9 L. Ed. 145 (1835).
"°31 Ohio St. 250 (1877).
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cise of the power, at and prior to the adoption of the constitution. From
the foregoing, as pointed out by Professor Edmund M. Morgan,
"It would seem to follow that if the history of judicial procedure shows the power to regulate it to have been exercised
by the courts exclusively or by the courts and the legislature in
common, there can be no constitutional objection to41vesting
such power in the judiciary by legislative enactment."' '
Reference to the history of the rule-making power would seem to
establish beyond peradventure that the power is judicial as well as
42
legislative.
It may be remarked that the objection of delegation of powers has
not been viewed seriously by any of the specialists who have investigated
143
this subject.
A recent case where a statute similar to the Washington act was
under attack as being an unlawful delegation of power is that of Ernst
v. Lamb 214 in which the Colorado Supreme Court held the act constitutional.' 45
Another constitutional question has been suggested with reference
to giving the Supreme Court power to make rules for inferior courts,
as being pertinent in those states where the jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court is limited to "appellate" or "revisory." The argument is that
the rule-making power is not "appellate" in nature but is merely that
"each" court may make rules for itself. With regard to this objection
Professor Hudson says that since the Supreme Court may correct the
lower courts' abuse of the rule-making power it is "not much of a step
beyond this for the legislature to say that all trial courts shall be
governed by rules which are promulgated by the Supreme Court.'1 46
Professor Morgan meets the objection by showing that in various states
at the time of the adoption of the constitution there were statutes in
force which recognized as one of the powers of the "appellate" courts
1"2 Mix.. L. REV. 81, 920.
2"See first portion of this article, 1 WAsH. L.

REv.

163.

"See "Proposed Regulation of Missouri Procedure by Rules of Court,"
Manley 0. Hudson, 13 L. S. Mo. BULL. 3; "Regulation of Judicial Procedure
by Rules of Court," Roscoe Pound, 10 ILL. L. REv. 163, -0A. B. A. Joun. 46;
"Actions at Law in the Federal Courts," Austin W Scott, 38 H.Av. L. Rzv. 1,
Committee Report, 37 Omo ST. BAn Assoc. REP. 18; "A Criticism of Colorado
Act for Procedure by Rules of Court," E. L. Regentter, 18 Coro. BAR. Assoc.
REP. 131, "Procedure Through Rules of Court," 1 Joun-. Ar. Jun. Soc. 17, 2
Mixx. L. REv. 81.
"2 Colo. 132, -013Pac. 994 (1923).
"See also Chicago v. Colman, 054 II. 338, 98 N. E. 5521 (1915).
"'Hudson, 13 L. S. Mo. Buix. 15.
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the right to make rules for other courts, and the constitutional pro14 7
vision will be viewed in the light of these statutes.
However we view the soundness of these answers, the short answer
to the objection is that, as a matter of history, it is clear that in many
instances the "appellate" courts have promulgated rules for the lower
courts, so much so that in the absence of legislation to the contrary
the appellate courts have power to make not only their own rules but
1 48
also the rules of other courts.
B. In the State of Washington.
In 1856 the fourth American edition of Tidd's Practice was published, and it may be said to represent fairly the common law view
of procedural rules at or about the time that codes of procedure were
becoming popular.149 The history of common law pleading and procedure in Washington and the territories from which the State of
Washington was later carved, indicates clearly that up to the time of
the enactment of the codes the principle exemplified by Tidd's Practice
was generally recognized. In fact the Ordinance of 1787, Article 2,
contains the provision that "the inhabitants of said territory shall always
be entitled to the benefits of
judicial proceedings according to the
course of the common law"
By act of Congress, April 27, 1846, Oregon Territory was established and the provisions of the Ordinance of 1787 were extended over
that territory. It does not appear clearly what was the practice in
Oregon at this time and prior to the organic act of Washington territory, except that certain rules were evidently made by the Oregon
courts, presumably in general recognition of the inherent power of
"12 Mix.

L. REv. 92.

"'This has been pointed out very clearly by Roscoe Pound, who says: "As
the English judicial organization stood at the time our constitutions were
adopted, trials were not had in the courts of Westminster as a rule. Trials at
bar in superior courts were rare. Cases were heard at circuit before the King's
justices or commissioners of assize and nst prius, so that a justice of the King's
Bench nght try at circuit under a commission of assize and nist prius a cause
depending in the Common Pleas or vwe versa. In other words, the trial courts
were independent tribunals quite as old as the superior courts. But the proceedings at circuit were reviewed on motion for new trial, motions in arrest,
motions for judgment and the like in the superior court en banc at Westminster.
When our constitutions were adopted practice for these cases was regulated by
general rules of the superior courts at Westminster, some of which had been in
force since the seventeenth century. It would seem, therefore, that the Supreme
Court of one of our states which has always been looked upon as the historical
eqmvalent of the Court of King's Bench might constitutionally be given the
power to regulate the practice in the causes it has the power to review on
banc, as was the doctrine at common law as between the court at Westminster
and the circuits." 10 ILL. LAW REv. 172-3.
4' See first portion of this article, 1 WASH. L. REv. 163, 166.
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the courts.'50 Furthermore, the federal practice, which recognized
the rule-making power as early as 1792, was either in force or used
by analogy in the early territorial courts.' 5'
The organic act of the Territory of Washington continued in force
the legislation of Congress in reference to the Territory of Oregon,
so far as applicable to the Territory of Washington, together with the
legislative enactments of the Territory of Oregon enacted and passed
prior to the passage of and not inconsistent with the provisions of the
Washington organic act "until they shall be repealed or amended by
future legislation." So that at the birth of Washington Territory the
rule-making power was apparently dual.
Reflecting the mode of procedure originated by the Field Code of
1848, the first territorial legislature of Washington provided by the
Laws of 1854, c. 5, p. 138, as follows:
"Section 36. All forms of pleading heretofore existing in
civil actions, inconsistent with the provisions of this act, are
abolished, and hereafter the forms of pleading, and the rules
by which the sufficiency of the pleadings is to be determined,
shall be those prescribed by statute."
This provision was carried into the session laws of 1860 and 1869,
and into the Code of 1881 and Hill's Code, and will be found in sub152
stantially the same form in our present code.
Though the Supreme Court said in State ex rel King County v.
Superior Courtl 3 that the common law rules of procedure were abolished with our first code, this statement must not be taken to mean
that by the adoption of the codes all rule-making power was taken
from the courts by the legislature for, (without resorting to internal
construction of the code and decisions under it), Artide IV, Section 24,
of the constitution reserved some rule-making power for the Superior
Courts, and the Supreme Court from earliest times has been given
power to make rules for its own practice not inconsistent with
54
statute.
In fact, it is with regard to Section 24 that the most serious constitutional question in the state of Washington arises. Article IV,
"oThompson v. Multnomah Co., - Or. 35 (1862), O'Kelly v. Terr. of Oregon,
1 Or. 51 (1853) Rules of Supreme Court of Oregon Territory, 1 Or. 11 (1859).
"I Bennett v. U S., - Wash. T. 179, 3 Pac. 372 (1883) Garrsonv. Cheeney,
1 Wash. T. 489 (1875), Stevens v. Baker, 1 Wash. T. 315 (1871) Nickels v.

Griffin, 1 Wash. T. 374 (1872).
'"Laws of 1860, c. 4, §28; Laws of 1869, p. 19, § 71, Code of 1881, p. 47,
§ 73; 2 Hill's Code, § 185; Rem. Comp. Stat., § 95.
104 Wash. 268, 176 Pac. 359 (1918).

Rem. Comp. Stat. § 1753.
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Section 24, of the state constitution, and Remington's Compiled
Statutes, Section 36, provide that:
"The judges of the superior courts shall from time to tune
establish uniform rules for the government of the superior
courts."
If this provision means that the Superior Court judges have a
thorough-going, rule-making power for their own courts, two conclusions must be reached, first, that the legislature has no authority or
power whatever to make rules of procedure for the Superior Courts,
and second, the Supreme Court could not have such power either with
or without legislative enactment.
Though this constitutional provision has never been definitely presented to the Washington Supreme Court, the whole trend of its'
decisions is that a Superior Court rule in conflict with a positive procedural statute must give way to the statute. In the case of Warburton
v. Ralph1"5 the court said.

"Where the law and a mere rule of court conflict with
each other, the former must, of course, prevail."
State v. Smith""' says that a rule of court is tested largely by the
"letter and spirit of the statutes," although the court holds that "court
rules" are "necessary for orderly procedure in the administration of
justice." In Sylvester v. Olson""7 the court refers to the inherent
power of the courts to relieve a party where an injustice has been done
unless there is a restriction expressed by statute.
The rule-making power contained in the recent act is that all forms
of pleading and practice and the procedure in all actions at various
stages of the actions shall be promulgated by the Supreme Court by
rule. The constitutional provision with regard to Superior Courts
is merely that these courts shall from time to time establish uniform
rules for their government. The use of the word "uniform" would
seem to indicate that one of the purposes of the provision is that there
be no conflict between the Superior Courts on the rules for their government, and, coupled with the use of the word "government," the
most natural and obvious meaning would be rules such as are referred
to in Article IV, Section 5, of the constitution, to-wit:
"The business of the court shall be so distributed and
assigned by law or, in the absence of legislation therefor, by
such rules and orders of court as will best promote and secure
the convenient, expeditious transaction thereof."
9 Wash. 537, 38 Pac. 140 (1894).
76 Wash. 460, 136 Pac. 678 (1913).
"5

63 Wash. 285, 115 Pac. 175 (1911).
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Furthermore, contemporaneous legislative construction of this phrase,
so far as it has weight, would seem to indicate a limitation of the
rule-making power given to those cases not covered by the general
practice code, for beginning with the Laws -f 1854, the laws of the
territory and state of Washington have contained a provision that the
forms of pleading and the rules by which the sufficiency of the pleading is to be determined, shall be those prescribed by statute.
The Laws of 1857, at page 10, contain a provision that the court
shall establish the rules prescribing the time in which pleadings subsequent to the complaint shall be filed. Here also is an express, or at
any rate a modified, limitation or grant of the court's power to make
rules.
In the preceding analysis of the statutes or constitutional provisions
m other states' 58 we have seen that in Arizona, Arkansas, Indiana,
Louisiana, Missouri, Nevada and North Carolina, there are provisions
as unlimited as the one in question, but in each jurisdiction the courts
have held that the reference was either to rules of decorum or to rules
in the absence of legislation and not to the thorough-going rule-making
power. Many of the provisions use the word "government" but it is
always limited either by a provision following or by decision to those
rules which the legislature has not enacted, whether from lack of
power or desire. 59
The use of the word "government" suggests reference to a question,
an understanding of which may throw light upon the provision of the
Washington constitution, z.e., where does the line exist at which the
legislature must stop in legislating for the courts?
As previously stated, though there is some dissent we cannot say
that the legislative regulation of judicial procedure is dependent for
its effectiveness on the acquiescence of the courts. To say this is to
See first portion of this article, 1 WAsH. L. REv. 163.
In rtato v. Withrow, 133 Mo. 500, 34 S. W ,45 (1896), in discussing the
effect of a provision similar in terms, the Missouri court said: "The power,
however, relates only to modes of procedure and is limited in its application
to cases wherein a rule of court might be held to have a legitimate bearing
towards facilitating the business of the court. Even so broad a power to
make rules of practice could not justly or reasonably be held applicable to
deprive a suitor in that court of any right conferred by the substantive, positive
law of the state. The limitations of the power need not be further discussed
at this time. Rule 37 is not in conflict with any law touching the mode of
empanelling a jury." The court then goes on to hold that this rule conforms
to the statute, or at least that it simply prescribes a detail or mode of proceeding to bring the jury into the box, and is not in conflict with the statute
with regard to challenges, or, as the court says, "does not clash with any command of the written law."
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belie the historical facts. 160 But, on the other hand, we cannot say
that the courts may regulate their procedure only by permission of the
legislature. Without discussing the power of the legislature in the
absence of constitutional inhibitions or provisions for separation of
powers, in the United States at least, the constitutions generally
recognize the doctrine of separation of powers. 161

This means that

the legislature cannot pass any act which either abridges the general
power of the courts to administer justice or which substantially
hampers the court in its functions.162 This is unquestionably the
rule, whether followed in practice or not. But the fixing of the line
in practice has not been so easy, though it must be stated there are
certain matters which all authorities agree the legislature may not
abridge or limit by legislation, particularly the power of the court to
effectuate its own acts by contempt process.' 6 3 As has been well said,
"It (contempt power) is indispensable to protect the court and the
administration of justice. Courts are not to be relegated to puppetdom."' 6 4 Other cases which may or may not be "border line" are
such as where the Supreme Court of Indiana refused to comply with a
legislative enactment requiring the judges to write head-notes to their
opinions, 66 and more recently Epstein v. State,"66
' which nullified a
statute attempting to limit the power of the court to require that
briefs in the Supreme Court contain a concise statement of so much
Other
of the record as constituted basis for assignment of error.
examples are the refusal of certain courts to permit the legislature to
determine the qualifications for admission to the bar, "7 the power of
the court to appoint necessary officials or bailiffs to conduct its pro" 34 H~Av. L. REv. 4-26.
'6 While the Washington constitution contains no provision regarding the

separation of powers, the Supreme Court has held clearly that our constitutional form of government is based upon the separation of powers, and "the
courts have been alert and resolute to keep these functions properly separated."
In re Bruen, 102 Wash. 472, 17-0 Pac. 1152 (1918). The constitution, Article IV
§ 1, provides that the judicial power of the state shall be vested in the Supreme
Court, Superior Courts, Justices of the Peace, and such inferior courts as the
legislature may prescribe. It is clear from this provision, as well as upon
established principles of constitutional law, that the legislature in the State
of Washington would have no authority to infringe upon or limit the inherent
power of a court created by the constitution.
" See, however, State exr rel N P Ry. Co. v. Superior Court, 101 Wash.
144, 147, 172 Pac. 336 (1918).
61

" McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. (U. S.) 316, 4 L. Ed. 579 (1819).
6134 HAuv. L. REv. 425.

2'Ex parte Griffiths, 118 Ind. 83, 20 N. E. 513 (1889).
166127 N. E. 441 (Ind.), 19,20.

"In re Mosness, 39 Wis. 509 (1876), In re Day, 181 Ill.
73, 5, N. E. 646
(1899) Petition of Splane, 123 Pa. St. 527, 16 At]. 481 (1889). Attorneys
are officers of the court; Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333, 378, 18 L. Ed. 366

(1866).
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ceedings in spite of limitation by the legislature, 168 and what may be
viewed as an extreme case, the refusal to follow a legislative enactment requiring the reasons for the decisions of the Supreme Court to
be in writing.1' 9
It will be seen that, whether or not we view all these rulings as
sound, they are made with regard to matters of internal "government"
merely. They refer to an interference with the actual machinery of
the courts rather than to the rules regarding the law suits themselves,
z. e., "rules of practice." Is. it not a reasonable explanation of the
Washington constitutional provision granting to the Superior Courts
the power to make rules for their government that the makers of the
constitution had in mind those matters over which the courts have
exclusive control which, generally speaking, go to the mechanics of
their own government or rules for internal management? These rules
may be of small detail or they may go to the actual operation of the
courts, or even to their existence, but the kind of rule is the same
though the degree be different. This argument is strengthened by an
examination of other constitutional or statutory provisions of a similar
nature which refer to the imposition of fines and sometimes impose
limitations on the right to create offices with pay.'7 0
It is unfortunate that the proceedings of the Constitutional Convention of 1889 have never been transcribed. The extant reports are
compiled from contemporaneous newspapers and we find no reference
to the provision in question. However, the reports show that the
provision requiring a report to be made to the legislature of defects in
administration of justice, which immediately follows the rule-making
provision,' 7' was discussed and viewed as a novel provision, but as
finally agreed, of salutary effect. From the discussion of the report
provision as well as from the provision itself we have an additional
indication that the legislature was the one to remedy the defects in
our procedure and therefore there was no intention to give such power
to the Superior Courts.
The provisions of the Washington constitution and statutes with
regard to the rule-making power of the Supreme Court should also
be considered. The constitution of Washington does not in express
' Stovenson v. Milwaukee Co., 140 Wis. 14, 121 N. W 654, 17 Ann. Cas.
901 (1909). This case shows that even m those states where the statute limits
the rule-makmg power of the court to such rules of practice as are not inconsistent with statute, the courts nevertheless retain the power to govern themselves and to do such acts as are necessary for their proper management.
"H'ouston v. Williams, 13 Cal. PA (1859).
1T
1 See statutes of Nevada, Califorma and Utah, cited in first portion of
this article, notes 115, 83 and 127, supra.
2
Ar. IV, § 25.
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terms give the Supreme Court any rule-making power whatsoever, not
even the power to make rules ior its own government.Y2 But on
December 23, 1889, 17 the first legislature passed an act giving the
Supreme Court the power to institute such rules of practice and to
prescribe such forms of process to be used in such court as may be
deemed conducive to the administration of justice. The rule-making
power given to the Supreme Court by the legislature was, therefore,
broader in language than that given the Superior Courts, though with
a limitation to such rules as are not inconsistent with law
From
this it may be argued that when the provision relates to "government,"
(i. e., inherent, exclusive power, or power to establish unimportant
rules of decorum) it was not thought either necessary or proper to
limit it by "not inconsistent with law;" but where the language included the establishment of "rules of practice and prescribing forms
of process," the limitation must be attached as the legislature might
desire (as it did in the same act) to regulate those matters itself.
It seems probable that contemporary lawyers and procedure specialists, many of whom were in both the Constitutional Convention and
the first state legislature, appreciated the difference in the language of
Article IV, Section 24, (the "government" provision) and the power
given to the Supreme Court. Strike out of the statute giving the
Supreme Court rule-making power the limitation "not inconsistent
with law," and you have given to the Supreme Court for its own
rules practically the same power it is now proposed to give the Supreme
Court for all the courts. Yet the Constitutional Convention, though
obviously aware of such a provision, did not use that language with
reference to "rules of practice and forms of process" in the Superior
71 4
Courts.
' 2 See Art. IV, § 94.
' Laws of 1890, p. 323, § 19.
.. While the provisions of the Laws of 1890, supra and the Laws of 1893
(Rem. Comp. Stat., § 1753) have some value for purposes of historical comparison, the power of the Supreme Court to make its own rules, as it existed
prior to the 1925 act, must be determined by Chapter 94, § 8, p. 36 of the Laws
of 1909, which provides as follows: "The Supreme Court may from time to
time institute such rules of practice and prescribe such forms of process to be
used in such court and in the court en bane and each of its departments, and
for the keeping of the dockets, records and proceedings, and for the regulation of such court, including the court en bane and in departments, as mar
be deemed most conducive to the due administration of justice."
It will be noticed that unlimited power to make rules is given, the most
inclusive phrase being "rules of practice." It is true that this phrase is
coupled with other provisions of a "governmental" nature and in this respect
it differs from Section 1753, but the language on close analysis is broad enough
to cover all details of appellate procedure. The section would seem to repeal
Section 1753, but whether it gives the Supreme Court power to make its own
rules, regardless of statute, never has been decided by the Supreme Court, and
it would seem probable that in view of the decisions of the court with regard
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However, whether we view the "government" provision as applying
exclusively to judicial matters, or to those matters which were not
actually regulated by the legislature, in practice, in the state of
Washington as well as for the most part wherever the rule-making
power was exercised by the courts, it related to the minutiae of practice
and not to its broader principles, and always in conformity to the legislature, except where the legislature obviously endangered the internal
75
operation of the court.
In other words, the general history of the law indicates that the
courts are slow to interfere with the legislature in any important procedural matters, and have allowed encroachments upon a power which
was originally viewed as inherent or unlimited. 7 6 Sometimes this
7
attitude arose from a sense of failure, and as Roscoe Pound says,1
if it had not been for the arbitrary refusal of the New York courts
to modify the common law rules of procedure themselves, bringing
them into harmony with modern conditions and common sense, occasion
for the Field Coce would never have arisen.
It is probable that as a matter of policy it is sounder to leave the
matter of regulation of rules of court to a mutual cooperation between
the legislature and the judiciary. At any rate, in view of decisions
of the Supreme Court of this state and the reluctance which every
lawyer should feel in a clash between the courts and the legislature
over such a constitutional provision, the better practical course unquestionably is to secure voluntary surrender of the power heretofore
exercised by the legislature, even if there may be some difference of
opinion as to the effect of Article IV, Section 24, of the constitution.
Certainly, when the legislature has voluntarily released to the Supreme
Court any claims it may have to make rules for the Superior Courts,
it would be following the shadow instead of the substance to insist
that the act was without force because of the constitutional provision
when precisely the same result can be obtained by the Superior Court
to the power of the Superior Courts if the question had been presented they
would have read into this statute the limitation "not inconsistent with law.'
At any rate, with the passage of the new act, the question is academic, as the
act provides that the rules promulgated shall supersede statutes in conflict.
I Austin W Scott, 33 H1v.L. REv. 236.
' T Apparently it is not consistent to say that the courts have "inherent"
power to make their own rules, and then qualify tis by saying, "unless the
legislature acts." If the power is truly "inherent," it cannot be taken away by
act of legislature, unless we define the word "inherent" as meanig that the
legislature cannot "create" or "abrogate" or "destroy" the power, but only
direct the manner of its exercise in such a way that it is not materially impaired.
For this latter construction of the "inherent" power of the court to make rules,
see In ro Bru n, note 161, supra.
1"1915 Olo Bar Assn. Rep.
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ratifying the rules laid down by the Supreme Court. The only basis
for insisting that the Superior Courts override the legislature and the
Supreme Court would be that the Supreme Court either is not exercising or not properly exercising the powers conferred by the act. It
must be presumed that the Supreme Court will do its duty under the
new act and do it well, and this is particularly true in view of the
establishment of the Judicial Council, 7 8 the object of which is to
secure effective action and harmony between the courts and the lawyers
on such matters as should be provided for by rule.
V
SCOPE OF RULE-MAKING POWER UNDER THE WASHINGTON ACT.

Since the passage of House Bill No. 158 at the recent session of the
Washington legislature, it is advisable to examine the scope of the
power to make rules therein conferred upon the Supreme Court.
The first thing to note with regard to the extent of the power is
that it covers both civil and criminal procedure in all tourts, the
words used being as follows:
"The Supreme Court shall have power
generally to regulate and prescribe by rule the forms for and
the kind and character of the entire pleading, practice and
procedure to be used in all suits, actions, appeals and proceedings of whatever nature by the Supreme Court, Superior
1179
Courts and Justices of the Peace
Since criminal actions are included, the act differs from the acts of
New Jersey, Connecticut and Delaware, which relate exclusively to
civil practice, and in language, though probably not in scope, is broader
than the Colorado and Michigan acts. In Maryland and Virginia
only is specific mention made of criminal procedure. 80
In the second place, obviously, the rule-making power applies to
"procedural" as distinguished from "substantive" law
The most
common definition of "procedure," quoted by Mr. Justice Miller in
the leading case of Krng v. Missourt,'8 from BISHOP's CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE, is as follows:
" 'The term procedure is so broad in its signification that it
is seldom employed in our books as a term of art. It includes
in its meaning whatever is embraced by the three technical
"TS
Laws of 1925, Extraordinary Session, c. 45, p. 38.
'"Laws of 19.25, Extraordinary Sess., c. 118, p. 187. The words "action,"
"practice," and "proceedings" are constantly used in the Code of Criminal Procedure, Rem. Comp. Stat. §§ 19-5-2252. See particularly § 2022, abolishing all
forms of pleading in criminal actions except as provided by statute.
"so
See the first portion of this article, 1 ,VAsH. L. REv. 163, 17--175.
107 U. S.921, 231, 0-7 L. Ed. 506, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 443 (1883).
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terms, Pleading, Evidence and Practice.' And in defining
practice in this sense, he says: 'The word means those legal
rules which direct the course of proceeding to bring parties
into the court and the course of the court after they are
brought in;' and evidence, he says, as part of procedure,
'signifies those rules of law whereby we determine what
testimony is to be admitted and what rejected in each case,
and what is the weight to be given to the testimony admitted.'"
Substantive law may be defined as "that part of the law which
creates, defines and regulates rights, as opposed to adjective or remedial
law, which prescribes the method of enforcing rights or obtaining
redress for their invasion.'

8 2

As to the meaning of the word "proceeding," as being included
within or equivalent to "procedure," and applying the term to a
criminal information, see City of Kansas v. O'Connor 83
It is surprising that the term "procedure" has not received more
attention. At the date of the Kring decision, (1883), Mr. Justice
Miller said.
"The word procedure as a law term, is not well understood, and is not found at all in Bouvier's Law Dictionary,
the best work of the kind in this country."
And even so late as November, 1925, in a case involving ex post
facto legislation, Beazell v. Ohio,'5 4 Mr. Justice Stone said.

"Just what alterations of procedure will be held to be of
sufficient moment to transgress the constitutional prohibition
cannot be embraced within a formula or stated in a general
proposition. The distinction is one of degree."' 8'
"Mix v. Board of Commissioners, 18 Ida. 695, 112 Pac. 215, 220 (1910).
'336 Mo. App. 591 (1889).
1925-1926 Adv. Op. 45, 46 Sup. Ct. Rep. 68 (1925).

In this case, the Supreme Court evinces the modern tendency to enlarge
the procedural field. In fact it may be doubted whether the Supreme Court
woull now approve the five to four decision in the Kring case if the question
were res nova. In the Kring case, the facts showed that at the time of the commission of the crime, in the state of Missouri, under the law, the acceptance by
the prosecuting attorney and the court of a plea of murder in the second degree
to an indictment of murder in the first degree, and the conviction and sentence
under it of murder in the second degree, was an acquittal of the charge of
murder in the first degree, and that he could not be tried again for that
offense. The Supreme Court of the United States held that a subsequent constitutional provision abrogating the former law and under which he could be
tried for murder in the first degree notwithstanding his conviction and sentence
for murder in the second degree, was an ex post facto law. The majority
opinion, by Mr. Justice Miller, is a powerful judicial statement, and the
minority opinion also contains a strong argument that the change was not a
deprivation of a vested right as it was "a mere procedure." The Beazell case
held that a subsequent statute allowing the court at its discretion to direct
separate trials of persons jointly indicted was not ex post facto.
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An additional difficulty in construing the meaning of the terms is
found in the small number of cases where the question is directly
presented, z. e., where there is an out-and-out definition of "procedure," "practice," or "substantive law." One of the few, if not the
only case directly construing similar terms in a rule-making act is
Ernst v. Lamb.861 There the limitation of time within which error
might be brought was held to be "procedure and practice" and within
the rule-making power.
In Jones v. Erie Ry Co.,""7 procedure is defined as "the machinery
for carrying on the suit, including pleading, process, evidence and
practice, whether in the trial court or in the processes by which causes
are carried to Appellate Courts for review, or in laying down the
foundation for such review" This case quotes the CENTURY Dic
TIONARY definition of procedure, which is, "the mode of conducting
litigation and judicial business as distinguished from that branch of
the law which gives or defines rights." In the case of Cochran v.
Ward8S procedure is stated to apply to the nature of the action, that
is to say, whether in form it shall be pleaded in covenant, detinue,
assumpsit or case, to the rules of pleading and evidence, the order
and manner of trial, the nature and effect of process, and to all other
matters of remedy only In State v. Farnham'8 9 the word "practice"
is defined, the court quoting with approval Bouvier's definition of
"practice" which is substantially the same as the definition of "procedure" above quoted and the definition by Rapalje and Lawrence
which is as follows:
"The law which regulates the formal steps in an action
or other procedure, which thereafter deals with writs, summons, pleadings, affidavits, notices, motions, petitions, orders,
trials, judgments, appeals, costs and executions."
After approving the definition of practice in substantially the above
terms and as given in WORDS AND PHRASES,' 8 0 the Oregon court said.
"From these we deduce the principle that jurisdiction as
applied to courts is power to hear and determine issues of
law and fact which means authority to perform any judicial
function. Practice includes the formula by which that
power is first asserted and afterward exercised in respect to
any litigation in all its phases, until the same is finally completed."
. Note 144, supra.
" 106 Ohio St. 408, 140 N. E. 366 (1922).

'115 Ind. App. 89, 29 N. E. 795, 31 N. E. 581, 51 Am. St. Rep. 229 (1899).
' 234 Pac. 806 (Or., 1925).
6 ,oiinS AND PHRASES, Ist Series, p. 5486.
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The reasons for this paucity of definition are; first, elasticity of the
terms themselves; second, the courts have had but few rule-making
acts for construction, third, the legislature has the power to pass both
substantive and procedural acts, so that the distinction does not become
pertinent except collaterally where it is usually confused with the
special issues involved.
In spite of the somewhat unsatisfactory condition of the law on
this subject, and while it is not the purpose of this article to make an
exhaustive analysis of the cases defining "procedure," or to collect all
of the cases touching the question, it may be helpful to indicate a few
of the lines of cases which define procedure or practice in some
manner whether directly or indirectly. In fact, where the terms are
as broad, not to say inexact, as they are here, definitions are not a safe
guide and the best way to get a balanced view of what the courts will
do in a case not already pigeonholed is to secure a general view of the
cases.
The most frequent discussion of procedure comes in those cases
discussing the application of ex post facto or retrospective constitutional
provisions. And of this type the ex post facto cases are in the majority.10 ' The general rule is, of course, that the term "ex post facto"
has no application to laws which merely effect or change modes of procedure, as no one has a vested right in mere procedure. 192 One of the
best statements of the rule is found in Lybarger v. State,l93 where
COOLEY ON CONSTITUTIONAL

LIMITATIONS is

cited to the following

effect:

"So far as mere modes of procedure are concerned, a party
has no more right in a criminal than in a civil action to insist
that his case shall be disposed of under the law in force when
the act to be investigated is charged to have taken place.
Remedies must always be under the control of the legislature
and it would create endless confusion in legal proceedings
if overy case was to be conducted only in accordance with the
rules of practice, and heard only by the courts m existence
when its facts arose."'

94

"'Fortunately, as the limitations of the grant will probably be most often
presented in criminal cases, although carelessly used, the term ex post facto
applies to criminal legislation only. State ex rel Thompson v. Snell, 49 Wash.
177, 94,Pac. 926 (1908), Note, 37 Am. St. Rep. 584.
'State
ex rel Thompson v. Snell, note 191, spra;Krng v. Missouri, note
181, supra; Beazell v. Ohio, note 184, supra.
"2 Wash. 552, 558-561, 27 Pac. 449 (1891).
The following have been held not to violate the ex post facto provision:
Requirement that jurors possess good intelligence, sound judgment and fair
character, Gibson v.Missouri, 162 U. S. 565, 589, 40 L. Ed. 1075, 16 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 904 (1896). And see State v. Newcomb, 38 Wash. 414, 109 Pac. 355
(1910). Law making competent, witnesses who were incompetent at time of
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In civil cases, the application of the constitutional provision is, of
course, limited to acts "impairing the obligation of contracts." Thus,
a judgment founded on a tort is not entitled to the protection of the
provision against retrospective legislation. "9 5
Within the class prohibited, procedural acts violating this provision
are controlled by the same general consideration that governs ex post
facto legislation, i. e., is it of such character as to destroy or impair
materially the right rather than simply indicating the manner of the
enforcement of the right? 196
The question frequently arises on the application of statutes of
limitation and the determining rule is well stated by Judge Chadwick
in Hewitt Logging Co. v. Northern Pacific Railway Co.,' 97 where
the court in holding that an act was constitutional which provided that
all claims concerning transportation overcharges should be filed with
the Public Service Commission within two years from the time the
cause of action accrued, and covering all actions brought after the
passage of the act, said.
"To define procedure, to make a condition precedent, and

to fix a limitation does not destroy the force of the constitution. On the contrary, a law so providing makes it efficient,
certain, and uniform in its operation. The substantive right
remains, that is all the citizen can insist upon, for it is held
under authority without limit that no litigant has a vested
right in procedure so long as his right of action is not abolished.'9 s
Many of the statutes of limitation as well as other procedural acts
are considered under conflict of laws. Probably the best reasoned and
the crime, Hopt. v. Utah, 110 U. S. 574, 589, 28 L. Ed. 262, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 202
(1884). Changing form of the grand jury, In re Wright, 3 Wyo. 478, 27 Pac.
565 (1891) People v. Campbell, 59 Cal. 243 (1881) State v. Kyle, 166 Mo.
287, 65 S. W 763 (1901) Lybarger v. State, note 193, supra; Wheeler Osgood
Co. v. Ralph, 4 Wash. 617, 30 Pac. 709 (1892) contra, Garnsey v. State, 4
Okla. Cr. 547, 112 Pac. 24, 38 L. R. A. (N. S.) 600 (1910) State v.Kingsley,
10 Mont. 537, 26 Pac. 1066 (1891)
State v. Rock, 20 Utah 38, 57 Pac. 532
(1899).
Gafney v.Jones, 39 Wash. 587 81 Pac. 1058 (1905).
"' In the case of State ex rel Phnney v. Superior Court, 21 Wash. 186, 57
Pac. 337 (1899), the Supreme Court recognizes that there are certain procedural
matters in civil cases, such as the costs or delays which might be so radically
affected by subsequent enactment that the change would amount to "more than
a procedure and would, in reality, affect or destroy material rights."
97 Wash. 598, 603, 166 Pac. 1153 (1917).
...
Cf Moore v. Brownfield, 7 Wash. 23, 34 Pac. 199 (1893) Baer v. Choir
7 Wash. 631, 32 Pac. 776, 36 Pac. 286 (1893) McAulirf v. Parker 10 Wash,
141, 38 Pac. 744 (1894) in which it is held that a reduction of time will not
be given a retroactive effect so as to cut off rights of action that have already
accrued until lapse of the period after the enactment. See also Murne v.Schwabacher Bros. L Co., 2 Wash. T. 130 (1882), where the court held that a right to
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most comprehensive American case on this point is Pritchard v.
Norton.103 As the court says, the principle involved in this type of
cases which makes them of interest in the definition of procedure is
that:
whatever relates merely to the remedy and constitutes part of the procedure is determined by the law of
the forum, for matters of process must be uniform in the
courts of the same country; but whatever goes to the substance
of the obligation and affects the rights of the parties, as
growing out of the contract itself or inhering in it or attaching
to it, is governed by the law of the contract." 200
VI.
MANNER OF PROMULGATION.

It is not the purpose of this article to discuss fully the method of
promulgation of rules of court, but it may be said that a formal
promulgation is necessary. 201 Nevertheless, in a proper case, the

majority opinion is that the court may modify or suspend the operation
of a rule already promulgated, and this would seem to be the law of
22
Washington.
VII.
NEW YORK AND THE RULE-MAKING POWER..

In this article New York state has been classified with those states
in which courts have power to make rules not inconsistent with statute
or for the purpose of carrying into effect statutory provisions, 203 and
execution and supplementary proceedings on a judgment under the statutes in
effect prior to 1881 could not be cut off by provisions of the Code of 1881,

without the allowance of a reasonable limitation of time. In this case, though

the right of execution on the judgment was destroyed by the new act, a procedure was provided for revival which would seem to be adequate. Otherwise
viewed, the case merely confirms the rule that reasonable notice of any procedural change must be given.
106 U. S. 14, 27 L. Ed. 104, 1 Sup. Ct Rep. 102 (1882). The reader is
referred to the text of the Pritchardcase for a masterly analysis of the opera-

tion of the lex fors and the various types of cases included in the "procedural"

as distinguished from the "substantive" class. For list of such cases see also
10 C. J., Cost. Law, § 78-0, pp. 1088, 1090, and Conflict of Laws, § 92, p. 485.
See also Maxwell v. Ricks, 294 Fed. 255 (9th Cir., 1993), rev. 985 Fed. 656

(W D., Wash.).

- In this case a distinction is made which must be borne in mind in examining cases of this character, namely, that the operation of the le fori extends
beyond the process and remedy so as to embrace the whole of that residuum
which cannot be referred to other laws.
Mi C. J. 907.

'Sylvester

v.Olson, footnote 157, supra; Wash. Bank V.Horn, 94 Wash.

299, 64 Pac. 534 (1901). See also 19 C. J. 9102.
-' See the first portion of this article, 1 WAsH. L. REV. 163, 179.
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this would seem to be the correct classification in view of the enactment of the Civil Practice Act in 1920. But no article on the rulemaking power would be complete without discussion or reference to
the attempt made by the New York Board of Statutory Consolidation
and many leading New York lawyers in 1920, and for some time
previous thereto, to secure for New York a thorough-going court
20 4
rule-making power.
The proposal contained in the report of the Board was for a short
practice act of 42 sections, general in its nature, to be called the Civil
Practice Act, and the adoption by the courts or a convention of judges
of 316 rules to be called the Civil Practice Rules and subject to modification without act of the legislature. These civil practice rules
contained many if not all of the desirable features of the English
practice. The rules were classified logically and conveniently, according to subject matter.
In the third volume of the report, the Board sets out certain provisions of the Code of CQvil Procedure designating them as "substantive
law" These provisions were "assigned so far as possible to existing
consolidated laws, but when such a course was not advisable, new
consolidated laws" were prepared, such as Evidence Law, Costs, Fees,
Disbursements and Interest Law Under the head of "Civil Rights
Law," amendments were proposed including various rights and limitations of actions formerly in the Code of Civil Procedure, but according
to the Board "not strictly of a procedural character," or within the
scope of rules of court. Embodied in the same class are provisions
with regard to Banking Law, Debtor and Creditor Law, Domestic
Relations Law, Lien Law, and many other special enactments of
similar character.
Clearly these latter provisions are substantive law, and have no
place in a code of procedure or in rules of court, but even if as a
matter of policy it was better to recommend segregation of laws affecting Limitation of Actions, Costs, and Evidence, it would seem, in view
of the decisions cited herein that many of the provisions designated as
"substantive law" are really procedural in character, some of which
might properly be subject to rules of court. Among the latter are
certain provisions covering the admission of documentary evidence, costs
on striking out scandalous matter and where several actions are brought
'" See REPORT

OF THE BOARD

OF STATUTORY

CONSOLIDATIO

ON THE SII.PLI-

(1915), 3 vols., particularly Vol.
ST. BAR Assoc. REP., p. 383-424, 441-483. See also, for

FICATIO-T OF THE CIVIL PRACTICE OF NEW YORK

1.

See also 44 N. Y.

complete discussion of rule-making question and other problems of revision
and codification, N. Y. ST. BAR Assoc. REP. A. D. 1907 to 1921.
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instead of one, and provisions governing depositions and bills of particulars.
While the New York legislature rejected the Board's recommendation of a short practice act and broad court rule-making power, it
enacted many of the proposed "Civil Practice Rules" as a "Civil
Practice Act," or code of 1540 sections adopting in the main the
Board's arrangement of sections. Subsequently under the limited rulemaking power the convention of judges adopted 234 rules in harmony
with the act. Therefore, though the adoption of the Civil Practice
Act was contrary to the theory that the courts have complete control
of rules of procedure, the experience of New York lawyers and the
decisions under the act are invaluable in determining the practical
operation of specific rules of a modern character. The experience of
New York state is also valuable, as it shows the danger of cast-iron
code enactment of rules, many New York lawyers regretting the lack
2 °5
of flexibility in the Practice Act.
VIII.
ADVANTAGES

OF THE RULE-MAKING

POWER IN THE COURTS.

If it is necessary to summarize the obvious advantages of giving
the courts the power to handle their own tools, no better statement of
the case can be given than that made by Chief Justice Taft in a recent
letter to the writer of this article. In this letter the Chief Justice
was referring particularly to a council of judges forming the rules,
but the same reasoning applies to the exercise of the rule-making power
by the Supreme Court.
"Relative to the wisdom of creating a council of judges
to form rules to secure a reform of judicial procedure, I have
no doubt of the efficacy of a judicial council for this purpose.
Congress or a state legislature has neither the time nor the
experience intelligently to frame and adopt a code of procedure making for simplicity and expedition. It should suffice
for the legislative body to define the jurisdiction of the courts
it creates and to lay down a few general outlines within which
the judicial council by rule shall frame the code. The judges
are constantly engaged in applying rules of procedure, and
they, more than anyone else, are advised of the defects in any
existing code, and with power to amend rules originally
adopted by them, they can mould the code as actual work
under it shows the necessity. Judges are more likely to be
' For full discussion of this matter and the practical operation of specific
rules with suggested modifications see series of articles by J. L. Rothschild in
the COLUMBiA LA W REvIEw, Vols. 23, pp. 618, 73-; 24, pp. 732, 865; -5, p. 30.
-26, p. 30.
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interested in doing the work needed to reform a code, because
it is the instrument they wield in performing their duties.
Legislators have a great diversity of business to attend to,
and it is hard to awaken their interest, even though they be
lawyers. Political measures command their attention, nor
the dry details of legal procedure. By vesting the powcr in
the courts, you avoid the constant tinkering with procedure
at the instance of legislators who are lawyers, and who seek
to remedy special cases without a broad general view and
knowledge of the whole code. Finally, when the council is
given power, the judges who constitute it will be properly
visited with the responsibility for the efficacy of the rules
they devise and the dispatch of litigation under them. This
will prompt them to close attention and stronger effort."
Ix.
CONCLUSION.

In conclusion, after examination of the history and cases touching
the power of the court to make rules and the condition of the rulemaking power in various jurisdictions, it may be said.
(1) That having passed through a period of rules by court and
by statute, as in the common law period, and then the period of exclusive statutory enactment, we are now on the threshold of a third
period, the making of all rules of court and procedure by the courts
exclusively.
(2) That the delegation to the courts of the power to make rules
is constitutional.
(3) That the power given by the Washington constitution to the
Superior Courts to make rules for their own government does not
refer to the thorough-going rule-making power, or general rules of
practice in conflict with statute.
(4). That the scope of the power under the Washington act extends to criminal as well as civil procedure, and covers every procedural step in litigation of any kind.
(5) That the advantages of the power, both in theory and practice,
are attested by many eminent scholars, lawyers and judges.
The rule-making power is yet to be exercised by the Supreme Court
of this state. Its intelligent exercise depends on the co-operation of all
the judges and the members of the bar, and it is to be hoped that after
careful study and discussion, important procedural changes of a beneficial character will be secured.
Charles H. Paul.
SEATTLE, WASHINGTOX.

